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ABSTRACT
The safety and efficiency of vehicular communications rely on the correctness of
the data exchanged between vehicles. Location spoofing is a proven and powerful
attack against Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems that can cause
traffic congestion and other safety hazards. Recent work also demonstrates practical
spoofing attacks that can confuse intelligent transportation systems at road intersec-
tions.
In this work, we propose two self-reliant schemes at the application layer and the
physical layer to detect such misbehaviors. These schemes can be run independently
by each vehicle and do not rely on the assumption that the majority of vehicles
is honest. We first propose a scheme that uses application-layer plausibility checks
as a feature vector for machine learning models. Our results show that this scheme
improves the precision of the plausibility checks by over 20% by using them as feature
vectors in KNN and SVM classifiers. We also show how to classify different types of
known misbehaviors, once they are detected.
We then propose three novel physical layer plausibility checks that leverage the
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) of basic safety messages (BSMs). These
plausibility checks have multi-step mechanisms to improve not only the detection rate,
but also to decrease false positives. We comprehensively evaluate the performance
of these plausibility checks using the VeReMi dataset (which we enhance along the
way) for several types of attacks. We show that the best performing physical layer
v
plausibility check among the three considered achieves an overall detection rate of
83.73% and a precision of 95.91%. The proposed application-layer and physical-
layer plausibility checks provide a promising framework toward the deployment of
self-reliant misbehavior detection systems.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Vehicular Safety and Accident Prevention
Between 2009 and 2014, a yearly average of 33,000 human fatalities in the United
States were due to vehicular accidents. While transportation is safer now than it
was in the past, the number of human fatalities caused by vehicular accidents rose to
39,032 in 2017.
In 2016, vehicle accidents accounted for around 24.9% of the total U.S. deaths
from unintentional injury (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018). The major
cause of these vehicular accidents is human error. Indeed over 94% are due to human
error such as drunk driving, driving and texting, speeding, reckless driving, etc. Thus,
addressing vehicle safety and accident prevention are a top national priority. While
cars are now being equipped with more cameras and sensors to give operators better
vision of the surrounding environment, as the above numbers show, human fatalities
are still a major issue.
1.2 Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
To address vehicular safety issues, the United States Department of Transporta-
tion (USDOT) has been promoting the adoption and deployment of Connected Au-
tonomous Vehicles (CAV) and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). CAVs aim
to reduce the number and severity of crashes and increase mobility and reliability
2of travel time (AECOM Michael Baker International Information Logistics, 2017).
The CAV technology combines both connected vehicles (CV) and automated vehi-
cles (AV). The term connected vehicles refers to vehicles equipped with low-latency
communication systems, such as Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC)
radios.
DSRC systems include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
technologies which must be timely, reliable, standardized, and secure. DSRC is based
on the IEEE 1609 and 802.11 protocols. Within IEEE 802.11, the DSRC is known
as the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) (Jiang and Delgrossi,
2008), which is meant to be an international standard applicable to other parts of
the world working with V2X. In WAVE’s standardization, the IEEE 802.11p Medium
Access Control (MAC) provides a set of specifications to support fast information
exchange between vehicles. A distinct IEEE 802.11 standard is needed because the
vehicular channel is rapidly changing and transactions must be completed faster than
in traditional IEEE 802.11 wireless local access networks (WLAN) (Fitah et al., 2018).
AVs distinguish themselves by the vast amount of embedded technologies that
support full control of the vehicular navigation. However, the AV technology does
not include by itself the ability to communicate with nearby vehicles or infrastructure.
CAV aims to combine CV and AV to provide a unified system for safety and traffic
efficiency, thus aiming to reduce human error and accidents.
As previously discussed, the CV technology aims to provide a link between each
vehicles onboard unit or computer with other vehicles or infrastructures nearby. V2X
aims to improve traffic safety and efficiency through timely over-the-air exchange of in-
formation between vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I). V2X
effectively increases the operator’s and vehicle’s line-of-sight, creating a safer environ-
ment. The society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has created and defined various
3types of exchangeable information between vehicles within the V2X network (Ken-
ney, 2011). Some of the message types are: Basic Safety Message, Common Safety
Message, Emergency Vehicle Alert, Intersection Collision Avoidance, Map Data, and
Personal Safety Message.
Out of all the message different message types, the Basic Safety Message (BSMs)
is the one we focus on in this thesis. BSMs are defined in the SAE J2735 standard.
A BSM contains situation data, such as the vehicle’s location, speed, acceleration,
heading, and brake status. BSMs are broadcasted via V2X networks which allow each
vehicle to have awareness of surrounding vehicles without having to rely completely
on physical sensors. Any vehicle or infrastructure within the communication range of
a broadcasting vehicle will receive these BSMs and should react accordingly. These
BSMs are broadcasted with the 802.11p protocol (Qian and Moayeri, 2008).
1.3 Certification and Authenticity
The authenticity and security of the data rely on the IEEE 1609 and 802.11p proto-
cols. The IEEE 1609 standards contain information on how the WAVE messages are
secured against eavesdropping, spoofing, and other application attacks (Qian et al.,
2008). The security infrastructure is based on the industry standards for Public
key Infrastructure (PKI), which include Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), hybrid
encryption methods, and WAVE certificate formats (Rabadi, 2010).
Vehicles authenticate and gain credentials using a Vehicular Public Key Infras-
tructure (VPKI). This infrastructure consists of Certificate Authorities (CAs). The
CAs, which are assumed to be trusted, issue certified public and private key pairs to
vehicles. It is assumed that several CAs are located in each geographical region to
address issues of scalability. Vehicle vendors may serve as CAs and when selling con-
nected vehicles, they provision them with credentials. For a vehicle to communicate
4Figure 1·1: Example of an attacker creating a ghost vehicle using
position forging
with other vehicles, it must sign each message with its private key and attach the
corresponding certificate (Raya et al., 2006).
1.4 Misbehavior
Concurrently to enhancing safety, V2X raises security risks. Specifically, attack-
ers may exploit this system of communication to broadcast bogus BSMs containing
fake vehicle location or speed in order to create ghost vehicles or imaginary traffic
jams (Brecht et al., 2018). It is indeed possible for vehicles within V2X to gain cre-
dentials and to broadcast fully authenticated messages. Hence, we should assume
that malicious nodes in the system could come with fully authenticated credentials
and be capable of broadcasting fake BSMs to surrounding vehicles.
As mentioned earlier, data authenticity in V2X is ensured by authentication pro-
tocols that are defined in IEEE 1609.2 (IEEE 1609.2, 2016). The problem is that
even if the data is authentic, its correctness is not guaranteed. If a vehicle were to
broadcast a position directly in front of another vehicle at a speed of 0 miles per
hour, that other vehicle is likely to activate the emergency brakes. If this happens on
a highway, such an action would likely cause collision and possible fatalities. Hence,
such misbehavior can have very severe impact. Other attacks that can be performed
by attackers are (Samara et al., 2010):
5• Fabrication Attacks: Attackers transmit false information into the network, this
includes position forging attacks;
• Denial-of-Service Attacks: Attackers take control of a vehicle’s resources and
jams the V2X;
• Message Suppression Attacks: Attackers selectively drop packets that may hold
critical information for the receiver, then the attacker can use them again in
other time;
• Alteration Attacks: Attackers alter existing data by delaying the transmission
of the information;
• Sybil Attacks: Attackers create a large number of pseudonyms which could
create fake congestions.
Some of these attacks have already been simulated and practically demonstrated
against current connected vehicle applications, such as Intelligent Traffic Signal Sys-
tems (I-SIG) (Ahn et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018).
Attacker Model
Given the impact and the possible misbehaviors in V2X networks, we focus in this
thesis on an attacker model with the following capabilities:
1. Has the credentials and certificates to broadcast fully authenticated BSMs;
2. Broadcasts from a single location;
3. Broadcasts at a fixed transmission power;
4. May own the majority of the nodes in a network or in the vicinity of a victims
vehicle;
6Figure 1·2: Credential revocation process
5. Performs position forging attacks.
Within this work we primarily focus and build on top of the Vehicular Reference
Misbehavior (VeReMi) dataset (van der Heijden et al., 2018). This dataset consists of
five fabrication attacks aimed specifically for position forging. This dataset is further
explained in Chapter 2.
1.5 Misbehavior Detection
The goal of a misbehavior detection procedure is to detect misbehaving vehicles so
that their certificate and credentials can be revoked. If a vehicle misbehaves it must
be possible to make other vehicles aware of the misbehavior. The most common
approach to raise such awareness is through the distribution of certificate revocation
lists (CRLs). These lists contain the most recently revoked certificates which are
maintained by the central authority. This process is illustrated in figure 1·2.
There exists a large literature on misbehavior detection in V2X networks to en-
sure that data contained in the BSMs are legitimate (van der Heijden et al., 2016).
For instance, schemes have been proposed to explore the plausibility of the data
within BSMs by cross validating their contents to ensure that their correctness. Thus,
7(Schmidt et al., 2008; Leinmuller et al., 2008; Bißmeyer et al., 2010) propose schemes
to check the plausibility of the behavior of the vehicle based on the reported BSM
contents. However, many of these methods apply only at the application layer and
have recently been proven to be ineffective in the context of attacks on ITS (Chen
et al., 2018). Chapter 2 further details on misbehaviors and practical misbehavior
detection.
Another limitation of existing misbehavior detection schemes is their reliance on
data or information from nearby vehicles in order to determine misbehavior. Thus, a
common assumption is that the majority of vehicles are honest. We aim to relax this
assumption in this thesis.
1.6 Contributions
Given the limitations of current misbehavior detection schemes, we propose and eval-
uate self-reliant misbehavior detection schemes. To improve application-layer plau-
sibility checks, we explore new schemes that combine them with machine learning.
Furthermore we venture into using the physical layer plausibility checks to support
misbehavior detection to overcome the weaknesses of the application layer. Our main
contributions are as follows:
1. Combine self-reliant plausibility checks and machine learning for misbehavior
detection;
2. Use machine learning to classify different attacks;
3. Create self-reliant plausibility checks using received signal strength;
4. Publish a dataset for future misbehavior detection work.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview about
the field of V2X networks, threat analysis, misbehavior, misbehavior detection, and
8the physical layer. Chapter 3 details our contribution on misbehavior detection that
combines application layer plausibility checks and machine learning. Chapter 4 details
our contribution on physical layer misbehavior detection. Chapter 5 concludes this
work and discusses future work.
9Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we discuss connected vehicles and V2X networks in section 2.1. In
section 2.2, we discuss possible threats and attacker models that can affect V2X
networks. In section 2.3, we highlight various misbehavior detection schemes and
their limitations. In section 2.4, we discuss physical layer properties and related work
detailing location plausibility schemes.
2.1 Connected Vehicles and V2X
The term cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been coined to encompass all kinds of
system that are characterized by a large deployment of networked devices equipped
with both sensors and actuators. In traditional embedded systems individual nodes
perform interactions and actions in real-time in a constrained environment; in a CPS,
nodes are deployed in large areas are highly networked (Amin et al., 2013). A system
consisting of vehicles, road-side units, and back-end systems is the CPS of interest
in this thesis. Benefits of adding a CPS like this consist of improving road-safety,
driving experience, and traffic management. This CPS is built by giving each vehicle
a wireless interface in order to create a dynamic ad-hoc network. Vehicles can use
this ad-hoc network to send and receive in a timely fashion information obtained from
each of their individual sensors, in order to create road vision and model the world,
which they can use to analyze and react on (van der Heijden et al., 2016).
Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is a wireless technology that improves traf-
10
fic safety and efficiency by providing timely exchange of information via Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2X) communication (Hartenstein and Laberteaux, 2010). This
wireless communication technology increases driver’s and vehicle sensors line-of-sight,
hence enhancing situational awareness. Information is exchanged via a form of dedi-
cated short-range communication (DSRC) technology, that is specifically designed to
support the applicability of V2X. V2X is also designed to enhance traffic management
and driving experience (Xu et al., 2004).
Vehicles communicate with each other via Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), defined
in SAE J2735 standard, thereby broadcasting every 100 ms their current locations,
speeds, accelerations, headings, etc. However, the network topology of V2X networks
is highly dynamic as vehicles often move in and out of range of each other (Hedges
and Perry, 2008).
Maintaining a long-term trust with all vehicles in the network is crucial for the
safety of the public. The authenticity of data, i.e. node-centric trust, is ensured
by authentication protocols defined in the IEEE 1609.2 (IEEE 1609.2, 2016), but
detecting the correctness of data broadcasted remains an open challenge. This issue
is also known as data-centric trust, where detection is focused on verifying data
accuracy mainly thanks to plausibility and consistency checks. Similar to Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), where a system monitors network traffic for suspicious
activity and issues alert when required, there is a need for a detection system that can
detect attacks inside V2X networks. The detection system should be able to detect
misbehavior and make decisions locally, to ensure timely revocation (Ruj et al., 2011).
2.2 Attacker Models and Threats
With the importance and scale of connected vehicles, there is a high risk that malicious
parties will attempt to attack the connected vehicle networks and systems. In this
11
section, we discuss possible threats and attacks that can impact connected vehicle
networks.
As previously described, vehicles in a connected vehicle network system send BSMs
which contain important and critical information on the vehicles real-time situation.
A large threat exists because these fully authenticated BSM’s are broadcasted and
accepted by surrounding vehicles. The work performed by (Leinmuller et al., 2008)
analyzes the such risks of V2X. The risk analysis is broken down into five steps:
1. Identify the system’s assets;
2. Determine the threats to the system;
3. Identify the system’s vulnerabilities;
4. Identify what vulnerabilities attackers can exploit;
5. Determine the risk.
In the case of V2X networks, the assets are the BSMs, the privacy of users, and
the communication system as a whole. In an active safe system, (Leinmuller et al.,
2008) describe two main threats to the system. The first is the loss of warning
messages and the second is the distribution of bogus or falsified data in the warning
messages. Both of these situations result in different threats to the classic security
principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The vulnerabilities of V2X
can be summarized as unprotected wireless communication. Unprotected wireless
communication means that everyone has free access to the communication media.
Since all the data is exchanged in an unencrypted manner, everyone can understand
anything that is transmitted within the V2X network.
The work in (Leinmuller et al., 2008) describes three types of attackers in a V2X
scenario:
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1. Road-side attacker: Attackers that are next to or close to a road with a machine
powerful enough to transmit or broadcast falsified warning messages to vehicles
to make them react such as activating their emergency brakes.
2. Vehicle (driver): Attackers that uses forged or falsified warning messages to
obtain personal advantages.
3. Infrastructure-based attacker: Attackers that collect large amounts of vehicle
movement to obtain vehicle(driver) movement patterns for their personal use.
Aside from these three main classification of attackers there are sub-classifications
depending on mobility, affiliation, intention, motivation, activity, and cooperation.
Mobility is intended to classify the attacker as either mobile or stationary. Affiliation
is intended to classify whether the attacker has credentials and is within the network
or the attacker does not have credentials and is outside of the V2X network. Intention
means to classify whether or not the attacker is intentionally trying to wreak havoc
on the system or is unintentionally misbehaving due to malfunctions in the vehicle.
Motivation is meant to classify whether or not the attack is launched for malice,
destruction, leisure, or profit. Activity is meant to see if the attacker is passive
or active in the network, meaning is the attacker participating in the network for
personal advantages, or just eavesdropping to collect information. Cooperation deals
with attackers who are either working in groups or individually.
Having talked about the risk analysis of V2X networks, we next focus on more
specific attacks that can be performed. If the GPS position of the BSMs is changed by
an attacker to cause malicious behavior within the network, the safety of the parties
involved may be compromised. Position forging attacks are extremely dangerous
because vehicles must react to the contents of BSMs. These position forging attacks
could potentially activate the emergency brakes of a vehicle. Work completed in
(Aijaz et al., 2006) analyzes the danger of position forging attacks.
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The work of (Chen et al., 2018) exploits the aforementioned vulnerability of ap-
plication layer plausibility checks to launch a traffic congestion attack against a real
Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG). An I-SIG uses BSMs broadcast by connected
vehicles to actuate traffic signals at an intersection and reduce congestion. The work
of (Chen et al., 2018) shows how to spoof the BSM payload in order to imitate a le-
gitimate vehicle, meaning that BSM fields such as acceleration, velocity, and position
are all cross-validated and appear to be valid. The attack can impact traffic control
signals at intersections, costing drivers several order of magnitude higher travel time
than normal.
Another dangerous attack is the so-called sybil attack. A sybil attack is described
and formalized by Douceur in (Douceur, 2002). A sybil is an attacker who compro-
mises the system by forging identities in a peer-to-peer networks, such as a VANET.
Since VANET is a distributed system, it is assumed that most nodes or vehicles within
the network has exactly one identity. In a sybil attack, a malicious node that spoofs
the identities of other nodes is referred to as a sybil attacker, and nodes whose iden-
tities are spoofed are known as sybil nodes. If the number of sybil attackers within a
network increases they can potentially take control of the entire network system.
2.2.1 Attacker Model
The attacker model in this thesis is based on position forging attacks implemented in
the VeReMi dataset. VeReMi is a labeled simulated dataset providing a wide range
of traffic behavior and attacker implementations. The simulations were performed in
Luxembourg SUMO Traffic (LuST) Scenario (Codeca et al., 2017), which aims to
provide comprehensive scenarios for evaluation in VEINS simulator (Sommer et al.,
2011). In the field of validating the performance of misbehavior detection schemes
against attackers, VeReMi is the only common dataset.
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Model. To classify the capacities of an attacker, we define the following:
• Scope: The scope is the area over which the attacker vehicle can cause damage
in the network. An attacker which is only able to control entities under a defined
communication range is termed as a local attacker.
• Inside: An attacker that possesses an authorized cryptographic material to
communicate with other entities in the networks is classified as inside attacker.
• Active: An inside attacker that injects forged information in the network is
known as active attacker.
• Uniform/Non-Uniform Region: The region defines the type of the road on
which vehicles are travelling within the scope. The attacker is referred to be
driving on a uniform region when the speed, direction, and path are expected
to be shared with all other vehicles for long time (highways). A non-uniform
region means that the attacker is driving on streets where speed, direction, and
path vary frequently.
The VeReMi dataset considers an active, inside local attacker, which injects forged
data in uniform and non-uniform regions.
2.2.2 Scenario and Attack Types
The VeReMi dataset comprises of five position forging attacks, three vehicle densities
(low, medium and high), three attacker densities (10, 20 and 30 percent). Each
parameter set is repeated five times for randomization. This dataset was built to test
misbehavior detection mechanisms in diverse scenarios.
Table 2.1 details the attacks along with the parameters considered. The dataset
contains the message logs of the attacking and benign vehicles, which includes re-
ception time stamp, claimed transmission time, claimed sender, unique message ID,
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Table 2.1: VeReMi Attack Types Description
ID:Attack Detail Parameters
1: Constant Attacker transmitsa fixed location
x = 5560,
y = 5820
2: Constant
Offset
Attacker transmits
a fixed, offset added
to the real position
∆ x = 250,
∆ y = -150
4: Random
Attacker sends a random
position inside the
simulation area
uniformly random
in playground
8: Random
Offset
Attacker sends a random
position in a rectangle
around the vehicle
∆ x ,∆ y
are uniformly
random from
[-300,300]
16: Eventual
Stop
Attacker behaves normally
for some time and then
attacks by transmitting
the same position
repeatedly
Stop probability
increases by
0.025 each
position update
GPS position (x, y, z), RSSI value, GPS position noise and speed noise vector for
each receiving vehicle in every scenario. Along with that, a ground truth file is also
maintained which records the true values of the BSM attributes of both attacker and
benign vehicles. The attacker type attribute in the Ground Truth file keeps the label
of the attack ID as described in Table 2.1.
2.3 Misbehavior Detection
Given that connected vehicles directly affect the activity of humans on the road,
malicious attacks have the potential to threaten the safety of large sums of people;
upholding the integrity and assuring the availability of these systems is extremely
important for that reason. Broadly speaking, there are two categories of protection
mechanisms: proactive and reactive. Proactive security tries to prevent potential at-
tackers from getting system access. Reactive security assumes that malicious activity
can happen internally within the system itself and must be detected (Leinmuller
et al., 2007). Since it is nearly impossible to account for every type of attack where a
malicious being can obtain access to the system, proactive security is rightfully com-
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plemented by reactive security. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are an example of
reactive security that has been well studied.
Intrusion detection brings up many relevant perspectives on the topic of misbehav-
ior detection. From our perspective, the main difference between intrusion detection
and misbehavior detection is that in misbehavior detection the attacker may be an
internal actor. The attacker uses its privileges to cause misbehavior in the system
(van der Heijden et al., 2013).
(Schmidt et al., 2008) proposes the VEhicle Behavior Analysis and Evaluation
Scheme (VEBAS) to create a scoring system for the legitimacy of vehicular behavior.
VEBAS incorporates many different plausibility checks in order to ensure that the
data in the BSMs are legitimate. A few of the plausibility checks in VEBAS include:
1. Acceptance Range Threshold: validates if the vehicle is within a legitimate
communication range;
2. Movement Analysis: validates if the vehicle is moving in a legitimate manner;
3. Minimum Distance Moved: validates that the vehicle is moving;
4. Sudden Appearance Warning: gives a warning if a vehicle suddenly appears
within the communication range;
5. Maximum Beaconing Frequency: ensures that the vehicle is broadcasting at
legitimate time intervals.
All of these plausibility checks rely on only on the application layer, which focuses
on the data being broadcasted. (Bißmeyer et al., 2010) proposes a model to track
the plausibility of the BSMs’ contents. This work focuses on a single fake vehicle that
can be identified based on the plausibility model even if the vehicle tries to simulate
plausible movements. This misbehavior detection model can be used to detect road-
side attackers simulating faked traffic congestions and attackers that try to deny real
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congestions by inserting moving vehicles into the network. The position verification
model represents another important contribution of this paper. The verification op-
erates as follows: first using a vehicle’s GPS position, a rectangle corresponding to
the vehicle is formed in space. Then using the coordinates of other vehicles, other
rectangles are formed. The model then checks if any of the rectangles (i.e. vehicles)
are overlapping in space. If they overlap then a misbehavior is detected. The problem
with this system is that it relies on other vehicle data to confirm whether or not one
vehicle is sending illegitimate information.
2.4 Physical Layer Properties
The physical layer is another way of detecting spoofed data in BSMs. The physical
layer can specifically counter position forging attacks which have proven to be very
effective attacks as previously discussed. Methods of misbehavior detection can use
these physical layer properties to perform localization.
2.4.1 Four Physical Properties
Following, are four physical layer attributes that one may consider for the purpose of
misbehavior detection.
• Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI);
• Doppler Shift ;
• Angle of Arrival(AoA) and Direction of Arrival (DoA);
• Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA).
The received signal strength indicator is the measured power when a receiver
receives a broadcasted BSM. RSSI-based localization is one way of determining mis-
behavior detection. Using the location of the BSM received and the RSSI of the BSM
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received it is possible to check if the BSM contents are legitimate by cross-validating
the relative distance and the RSSI. However, techniques in the past have always relied
on multiple antennas collaborating to determine location, and have not been tested
with actual vehicles.
(Nguyen et al., 2017) proposes using multiple antennas and a matching algorithm
called MLMatch to determine if a device is legitimate. The observed RSSI is used
to generate a database in order to identify the most likely location of the emitting
devices. Again, the system relies on using multiple receiving antennas to identify RF
angles of arrival and triangulate the location of the emitting devices.
The range-based method estimates the distance from a number of known devices
which are known as anchors. The RSSIs collected at multiple receiver antennas de-
termines the position of the transmitter. Another method is based on RF multihop
statistics. All of these methods are discussed in (Nguyen et al., 2017).
(Xiao et al., 2006) proposes another localization verification system. The de-
tection process of the system depends on measurements from other vehicles. This
method also focuses on defending against sybil attacks which means that it needs to
receive multiple spoofed BSMs in order to perform detection. This method uses a dis-
tributed and localized approach based on RSSI measurements, as well as algorithms
that detect sybil attacks over a period of time. However, this method cannot imme-
diately make a decision on whether or not an attack is taking place, which proves to
be a liability in terms of safety.
(Yao et al., 2017) proposes using the RSSI of BSMs for detecting Sybil attacks
without localization. A Sybil attacker generates several fake identities with false
messages, severely impairing the functions of safety-related protocols. The method of
(Yao et al., 2017) exploits statistical properties of the RSSI of surrounding vehicles
to detect Sybil attacks. Vehicles are classified as part of a Sybil attack if their RSSI
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values are sufficiently similar to those of other vehicles, implying that the BSMs are
being emitted from the same source. The limitation of this method is that it does
not take into account a malicious vehicle that does not transmit its own location but
generates a singular ghost vehicle at a different location.
Doppler shift is defined as a change in the frequency of a received message due to
the Doppler effect (Dicke, 1953). The Doppler shift can be used to detect the velocity
of a transmitter relative to the receiver. (Sun et al., 2017) proposes a physical layer
method to detect misbehaving vehicles, using Doppler speed and angle-of-arrivals.
The method relies on a trust scoring mechanism which is implemented by surveying
other vehicles in the network. The system applies Kalman filtering and chi-squared
tests to the Doppler speed, which is derived from Doppler shift, and the angle-of-
arrival data to determine the most trustworthy vehicle within a vehicle’s perimeter.
The system then relies on that vehicle as a reference to test the trustworthiness of
other vehicles.
(Das and Saha, 2015) suggest a method for misbehavior detection using vehicle
positioning. This work is a patent that uses multiple antennas to compute the time-
difference-of-arrival and the angle-of-arrival to accurately track the vehicle location.
Time-difference-of-arrival is a scheme that uses the precise difference between the
arrival of a signal at different anchors to determine location. Angle-of-arrival uses
multiple receiving antennas or circular array antennas to determine the relative di-
rection of the signal. However, this method relies on many external factors such as
extra antennas, and synchronization between clocks, and multiple vehicle sources.
Moreover it relies on pre-defined thresholds, which means that this method is not
robust or adaptive in different environments.
(Yan et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2013) use angle-of-arrival and the GPS coordinates to
check for sybil attacks. However this detection method only focuses on sybil attacks
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and was not tested for the robustness on single road-side attackers conducting attacks
such as the traffic congestion attack explained earlier.
In contrast to prior work in literature, the methods presented in this thesis are
self-reliant: they do not require collaboration with other vehicles and do not assume
that other vehicles are honest. Moreover, the effectiveness of our methods is evaluated
against various types of attacks, not only a single one.
21
Chapter 3
Novel Machine Learning Application
Layer Misbehavior Detection
3.1 Introduction
The safety and efficiency of vehicular communications rely on the correctness of the
data exchanged between vehicles. In this chapter we address the issue of detecting
and classifying location spoofing misbehavior using the VeReMi dataset. We propose
a framework for a system that uses plausibility checks as a feature vector for machine
learning models to detect and classify misbehavior. Using KNN and SVM, our results
show we can improve the overall detection precision of the plausibility checks used
in the feature vectors by over 20%, while maintaining a recall within 5%. We define
precision and recall later in this chapter. We have also proven once a misbehavior
has been detected it is possible to classify different types of known misbehavior’s.
Classifying the misbehavior types allows for more accurate and specific action steps
to counteract the attacks, hence improving the ability to recover safety and security
in the system.
Machine Learning (ML) has indeed demonstrated encouraging results in the field
of anomaly detection in time-series data. ML-trained models have the ability to
learn complex pattern and behavior, making it a suitable solution to distinguish
packets that deviate from normal behavior. In this chapter, we therfore investigate
the feasibility of supervised ML-based model that utilizes the BSM data to detect
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and classify the type of the attack(s). We have exploited VeReMi dataset (van der
Heijden et al., 2018), a labeled dataset built in VEINS (Sommer et al., 2011), that
offers five different types of position forging attacks.
Our approach utilizes feature vectors extracted from BSMs using our predefined
plausibility checks (see Section 3.3) and integrates them with supervised machine
learning models to detect and classify the type of attack as shown in Figure 3·1. In
our analysis, we have consider two classification algorithms:
1. K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN) (Ismo et al., 2004);
2. Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Nyakundi, 2015).
One should note that the objective of this work is not to compare the two clas-
sifiers detection performances, but to provide a detection mechanism baseline to the
community by exploring common ML techniques.
The contributions of this chapter are fourfold:
1. We define of plausibility checks and integration into feature vectors then used
in supervised ML techniques to improve the overall precision value of the
misbehavior detection system.
2. We demonstrate an ML-based model that classifies accurately messages as mis-
behaving without requiring collaboration between entities in the VANET.
3. We introduce a matrix that exhibits five different types of position forging
attacks and demonstrate how the ML detection model classified the attacks
that behave similarly.
4. We create an ML-friendly VeReMi dataset to facilitate comparison and repro-
ducibility.
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Figure 3·1: Flowgraph of Detection and Classification
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the machine learning
background and the work done on the published dataset. Section 3.3 discusses the
feature vector used for the machine learning models. Section 3.4 explains the imple-
mentation of the machine learning models. Section 3.5 highlights the results of the
experiments conducted. Section 3.6 discusses and analyzes the key points from the
results.
3.2 Background
K-Nearest Neighbour (K-NN). K-NN analysis is a common anomaly detec-
tion/classification technique and widely used due to its simple implementation and
ability to naturally handle multiclass cases (Ismo et al., 2004). In our evaluation, we
have used regular K-NN which analyzes the behavior of data points according to its
previously broadcasted position based on Euclidean distance. A data point is labeled
as an outlier if it is situated farther away from its previously broadcasted points.
In Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition,
KDD cup 1999 dataset was used to build a IDS using classification algorithms. The
1-nearest neighbor classifier algorithm, 1-NN, performed comparable to the winning
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entry and demonstrated impressive results in terms of detection (Elkan, ). Li et al. (Li
et al., 2014) investigated the effect of the Flooding Attack in wireless sensor networks
and presented an intrusion detection system based on K-NN algorithm. The K-NN
algorithm was successfully able to detect the abnormal nodes using the frequency of
sent messages as a feature vector.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). SVM is a discriminative classifier, defined by
a separating hyperplane, that maps the data points on the plane.This linear machine
belongs to the class of Kernel methods with problem-specific kernel function. The role
of kernel function in SVMs is to induce a feature space by mapping the training data
on a high dimensional space where it is linearly separable. SVM have demonstrated
success in the field of text mining, pattern recognition, object classification, and
anomaly detection (Wang, 2005). (Nyakundi, 2015) exhibited classification of different
types of intrusions using supervised learning techniques on the ISC2012 dataset, a
popular benchmark dataset for intrusion detection (Sharafaldin et al., 2017). The
work demonstrated that SVM, with a detection accuracy of 99.1%, could be used
successfully as a classification module of a network anomaly IDS. In (Maglaras, 2015),
the author demonstrated a cloud-based mobile distributed intrusion detection system
for VANET that detects Denial-of-Service attack using One Class SVM (OCSVM)
classifier with RBF kernel and score the anomalies using recursive K-means clustering.
(Maglaras, 2015) proposed system accuracy was compared on the number of trans-
mitted beacon by vehicles, the speed of intruder vehicle, and the distance between
Road Side Units. It was then compared with what is meant to be “normal”. Once
the attack is detected, the system sends a report to a central authority. But there
are two major concerns with this approach. First, the RSU is a single point of fail-
ure. If compromised, the whole system fails. Also, relying on presence of RSU could
be problematic. Second, they did not mention what attributes were considered for
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feature extraction, which is one of the most important tasks in building a ML-model.
To assess the effectiveness of misbehavior detectors, it is important to select the
right dataset. Different approaches could be taken to select the dataset: real-world
field tests, analytical models, and simulations (van der Heijden et al., 2016). Current
datasets do not appear to be an optimal choice due to (i) the absence of attackers, (ii)
inconsistency in BSMs broadcast rate (O’Hara, 2019), and (iii) the presence of single
vehicle (Caocsar, 2019). Therefore, we use the VeReMi dataset (van der Heijden
et al., 2018), which has been recently published and built specifically for testing V2X
security. This is a labeled dataset, which is convenient for training the ML-based
model to learn attacker’s as well as normal vehicle’s behavior.
3.2.1 Parsed Dataset
Along with the variety of attackers introduced in the VeReMi dataset, the authors
have also included four basic plausibility that were evaluated using Precision-Recall
curve (van der Heijden, 2018).
In each scenario, a log of approximately 500 receiving vehicles in the form of JSON
files can be found. Each file maintains a record of BSMs received by single vehicle
(same ID) from neighboring vehicles (300-meter range) during its entire journey. The
first requirement was to build a sender-receiver pair, defining the complete journey
for an individual sender. All JSON files, in a single scenario, were converted to CSV
format and then concatenated together. Additional attributes named Attacker Type
and Receiver ID were added to the created concatenated CSV file. The “Attacker
Type”, labeling attackers ranging from 0-5, 0 being the normal vehicle and 1-5 the
different attacks types, were mapped from original Ground File (came with original
dataset) to concatenated CSV file. The second attribute, “Receiver ID”, was added
specifically to build the sender-receiver pair. Scripts were written to include these
two attributes. The dataset also includes an attribute named “Type2” in JSON
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files, which maintains the receive time, position vector, position noise, speed vector
and speed noise calculated by TraCI, a SUMO API (Behrisch et al., 2011), for an
individual vehicle. A Matlab script was written to filter “Type 2” messages and
NaN values from the dataset. After parsing the data in Matlab, we designed our
own plausibility metrics, Feature 1-6 (see Section 3.3), to analyze our data-centric
detector.
3.3 Feature Vector
Feature extraction has a vital role in the performance of machine learning algorithms.
The parsed dataset includes all the transactions between the vehicles; however the
machine learning algorithms must classify the entire duration of the interaction be-
tween receiver-sender pair as anomalous or normal. Each receiver-sender pair has
data from the BSM packets sent by the sender throughout different times in the
interaction. Since the machine learning models will need to classify the entire inter-
action instead of singular points in time, the interactions must be condensed into a
singular feature vector. This feature vector must contain key pertinent information
on the sender’s behavior throughout the entire time that the sender was inside the
receiver’s communication range. In addition to those features, we also include two
plausibility checks, capable of detecting fake location attacks, in the feature set. In
total we create a feature vector with 6 dimensions: 2 categorical features that are
location plausibility checks, and 4 that are quantitative information used to describe
the vehicle’s behavior.
3.3.1 Location Plausibility Check: Feature 1
Feature 1 serves as a location plausibility check, which yields a plausibility score
between [0,4], 0 representing the sender reports valid GPS coordinates. Having a
plausibility score is important because it gives more information about how much
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the vehicle was misbehaving. We give a score [0,2] on the plausibility of the x and
y coordinates and the sum of those two plausibility scores is the overall location
plausibility score. The sender’s reported GPS location is compared to a range of
plausible locations predicted based on the previous velocity, previous GPS location,
and a distribution of average accelerations. Since the x and y location of the sender
will receive two separate scores, two ranges must be computed. In order to create the
range of locations where the sender could be, a confidence interval for the acceleration
needed to be defined. The confidence interval was obtained by first observing all of
the data, ensuring that the distribution for the average acceleration is similar to
a Gaussian distribution. After that observation was made, the mean µ and the
standard deviation σ were calculated. The confidence interval was then calculated
at 95% and 99% confidence. The confidence interval for the average x-acceleration is
[-4.6983, 5.2265] and [-7.1795, 7.7077] for 95% and 99% confidence respectively. The
confidence interval for the average y-acceleration is [-8.1203, 8.0501] and [-12.1629,
12.0927] for 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
Using different levels of confidence, the predicted range of plausible locations of
the vehicle were computed using the following formulas (due to space limit only for
x-coordinate and 95% shown below):
predicted(x,95) = xi + ∆t(v(x,i) + a(x,95) ∗∆t) (3.1)
Where in Equation 1:
• predicted(x,95): range of predicted x values within 95% confidence
• v(x,i): velocity of the previous BSM message in the x-direction
• xi: previous GPS x-coordinate
• a(x,95): acceleration in the x-direction range within 95% confidence
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• ∆t: difference in time between the previous packet and the current packet
If the x-coordinate of the current GPS location is within the predicted 95% con-
fidence range, then the plausibility score for x is 0. If the location lies outside of the
95% range, but within the 99% range then the plausibility score for x will be 1. If
it is outside of the 99% range then the plausibility score for x will be 2. Doing the
same steps for y and summing the plausibility score for x and y will yield the total
plausibility score. This score is calculated for every packet received throughout the
duration, hence the maximum score is used. Note that this location plausibility check
does not consider maps, and does not check whether or not the vehicle is on the road.
3.3.2 Movement Plausibility Check: Feature 2
This feature is a plausibility check for constant location. This feature compares the
average velocity during the entire sender-receiver pair calculated from the total dis-
placement between the last and first GPS location received from the sender, and the
velocities and time intervals for each of the sent BSM packets. If the total displace-
ment is 0, but the average velocity is not 0 the value of Feature 2 is 1, otherwise 0.
Note that Feature 2 only gives information if the first and last packet of the vehicle
have the same GPS position, with non-zero velocities.
3.3.3 Quantitative Information: Features 3, 4, 5, and 6
In contrast to Feature 1 and 2, Feature 3, 4, 5, 6 are not plausibility checks, but rather
are numerical features describing the behavior of the vehicle. Features 3 and 4 are the
difference between the calculated average velocities based on total displacement and
time, and the predicted average velocities based on the reported velocity and time in
the x and y direction respectively.
vdistance =
xf − xi
totaltime
(3.2)
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vvelocity =
∑f−1
j=i velocityj ∗∆t(j+1)−j
totaltime
(3.3)
• vdistance: average velocity calculated based on distance reported by GPS location
• vvelocity: average velocity calculated based on the reported velocities by the
sender
• xf : final GPS location sent by sender
• xi: initial GPS location sent by sender
• totaltime: total time between the initial and final BSM sent by sender
• velocityj The velocity reported at packet j
• ∆t(j+1)−j: time between two consecutive packets j + 1 and j
Feature 5 is the magnitude of Feature 3 and 4, noting that Feature 3 is for the
x − direction and 4 is for the y − direction. Feature 6 is the total displacement
between the calculated distance, and the predicted total displacement based on the
average velocity. Since Feature 3, 4, 5, and 6 do not make a definitive suggestion on
whether or not the vehicle is behaving in a legitimate manner, these features are not
considered plausibility checks.
3.4 Machine Learning Implementation
3.4.1 K-Nearest Neighbor
The implementation for K-Nearest Neighbor was done using a Matlab built-in func-
tion fitcknn. The dataset was randomly divided into five folds: four folds for training
and cross validation and one fold for testing. The Euclidean distance was used to
compute the nearest neighbor, and the model was tuned with different values of K
ranging from 1-100. The metric used to tune K was the correct-classification-rate
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(CCR). Using the training data, the K that yielded the highest CCR was chosen to
predict the labels of the test data. After testing, the confusion matrix was obtained,
hence allowing the precision and recall to be computed.
3.4.2 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
The implementation for Support Vector Machines or SVM was done using the Matlab
built-in function fitcsvm. Similarly to KNN, the dataset was randomly divided into
five folds: four folds for training and cross validation and one fold for testing. The
kernel used was the radial-basis function:
k(x, y) = exp(
||x− y||2
2σ2
) (3.4)
The tuning parameter was the box constraint, which was cross-validated at 2c where
c = {−9,−8, .., 10}. Using the CCR as the optimization metric, the best value for
the box constraint was obtained. Using this value for the SVM model, the predicted
labels for the test set were obtained.
3.5 Results
The performance of the algorithms is measured by the precision and recall. The
precision is TP
TP+FP
. A true positive (TP) is an attacker that was detected as an
attacker, and a false positive (FP) is a normal vehicle detected as an attacker. The
recall is TP
TP+FN
, where false negative (FN) is an attacker that was not detected as an
attacker.
In these results we aimed for a comparable recall between the two plausibility check
features and the two machine learning models. However, to evaluate improvements
from plausibility checks, we intend to show that combining plausibility checks with
raw information about the vehicle as an input to a machine learning model will make
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the detection more precise, i.e. higher precision for SVM and KNN.
3.5.1 Detection Per Attack Type
In this section, comparisons between the two plausibility checks and two machine
learning models is explored for each attack type listed in Table 2.1. It is important to
note that for each of these experiments, only the corresponding attack data was used.
For example attack type 2’s data was not used in attack 1’s training and test set. For
these results, if Feature 1 yields a value greater than zero, then it is considered as an
attack. Feature 2 is treated similarly to Feature 1 in order to show the performance of
the KNN and SVM relative to the individual plausibility check features, thus showing
why individual plausibility checks are not sufficient. To ensure consistency in these
results, the same test set, i.e. fold, was used in KNN and SVM.
Attack Type 1: Constant Position
Attack type 1 was expected to be successfully detected by KNN and SVM due to
Feature 1 and 2. The plausibility checks for location should have been able to detect
a constant position attacker, since the attacker BSM reported a non-zero velocity
at each time interval and kept the GPS position the same. Since these plausibility
checks are capable of detecting attacks individually, KNN and SVM should perform
well.
As observed in Table 4.2, the overall CCR of the two implemented machine learn-
ing models were better than the two plausibility check features. However, the recall
for Feature 2 is better than both KNN and SVM. This shows that a raw plausibility
check such as Feature 2, which is specifically sensitive to detecting attack type 1, may
result in a higher recall, but also has significantly lower precision. The precision for
both KNN and SVM were much better than both plausibility feature. Remember that
both KNN and SVM were tuned using CCR which means that the precision and recall
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Table 3.1: Attack Types Detection Results
Detection Method CCR Precision Recall
Type 1
Feature 1 0.8588 0.6985 0.8028
Feature 2 0.8987 0.7222 0.9912
KNN 0.9452 0.9521 0.8328
SVM 0.9564 1.000 0.8290
Type 2
Feature 1 0.6821 0.2598 0.1215
Feature 2 0.6775 0.2679 0.1399
KNN 0.7508 0.5613 0.1937
SVM 0.7543 0.5729 0.1788
Type 4
Feature 1 0.8847 0.7524 0.8822
Feature 2 0.6570 0.2618 0.1178
KNN 0.9463 0.9506 0.8363
SVM 0.9116 0.8149 0.8860
Type 8
Feature 1 0.8872 0.7311 0.8776
Feature 2 0.6800 0.2401 0.1217
KNN 0.9471 0.9627 0.8253
SVM 0.9177 0.8035 0.8755
Type 16
Feature 1 0.7604 0.5104 0.6029
Feature 2 0.7222 0.4495 0.5827
KNN 0.8173 0.7143 0.4254
SVM 0.8403 0.8162 0.4636
reported may not be the highest precision recall as seen in Figure 3·2; hence, this may
also be another reason for the lower recall performance by both models. Overall the
ML models are better for detecting attack type 1 than a plausibility checks such as
Feature 1 and Feature 2 in terms of precision and CCR; however may have a slightly
higher miss-rate.
Attack Type 2: Constant Offset
As seen in Table 4.2 and Figure 3·2, the precision and recall results for attack type
2 were poor. Given that the machine learning model was trained to detect inconsis-
tencies or misbehaviors in the senders BSM message, intuitively the poor results for
attack type 2 were expected.
The constant offset attack means that the attacker is moving and behaving nor-
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Figure 3·2: Precision-Recall Curve of KNN and SVM for Different
Attack Types
mally, however the attacker is putting a constant offset on BSM GPS location. This is
very difficult to detect since the attacker’s BSM data is behaving normally. There is
no way of determining simply on the BSM data that the attacker is putting an offset
since the attacker is reporting legitimate behavior. In order to detect this attack the
physical location would need to be cross referenced to other vehicles location, physical
layer properties, or checking maps to ensure that the vehicle is still on the road.
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Attack Type 4: Random Position
Attack type 4 should be covered by plausibility metrics. Feature 1 should be able
to determine whether or not the random GPS location of the attack is within a
reasonable range; however, if the random GPS location sent by the attacker vehicle
falls within the threshold, it will be missed.
From Table 4.2 and Figure 3·2, one can see that the recall for Feature 1 is compa-
rable with the recall for both KNN and SVM. In terms of precision, KNN and SVM
performed better than Feature 1. For this attack, SVM and KNN have a detection
rate within 5% of the plausibility check, while beating the plausibility check precision
by over 5%.
Attack Type 8: Random Offset
Similar to attack type 4, the random offset should be detected with Feature 1. The
difference between type 4 and type 8 is that attack 8 has a limited range to the
randomness, which leads to a lower recall.
As seen in Table 4.2 and Figure 3·2, the recall or detection rate is similar and is
within 5% of Feature 1, but the precision is higher by over 15%. This shows that
for attack type 8, using the machine learning model, either KNN or SVM, is more
optimal than using Feature 1.
Attack Type 16: Eventual Stop
The expected performance of ML-based detection algorithms should be similar to
attack types 1, 4, and 8; however the results show otherwise.
As we can see in Table 4.2 and Figure 3·2, the recall for KNN and SVM is lower
by less than 20% than the two plausibility features; however the precision is better by
over 20%. Feature 2 becomes relevant in this case again, because attack type 16 is the
sudden stop attack. With this experiment a finding was observed on the limitations
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Table 3.2: Overall Attack Detection Results
Detection Method CCR Precision Recall
Features 1 0.8155 0.6407 0.6635
Features 2 0.7270 0.4704 0.3841
KNN 0.8788 0.8879 0.6166
SVM 0.8838 0.8716 0.6515
of this dataset. The sudden stop attack is based on a probability of stopping, which
means an attacker vehicle will stop based on a probability and there is no guarantee
of stopping. The problem is that throughout the entire duration of the interaction
between the receiver-sender pair, the attacker may never behave like an attacker
even though it was labeled as such. The attacker vehicles will have been labeled as
attackers, however behave normally throughout the entire time. This is the cause for
the low recall. The slight dip in recall for KNN and SVM compared to the drastic
dip in precision by Feature 1 and 2 show that using the machine learning models is
more optimal in attack type 16.
3.5.2 Overall Attack Detection
In order to assess the overall practical application of ML-based misbehavior detection,
all the data for the attack types were merged into one dataset. Attack types 1, 2, 4,
8, and 16 were labeled as 1 and the normal data as 0. The results in Table 3·3 show
that the detection rate or recall for SVM is similar to the location plausibility check,
Feature 1 at approximately 65%, however the precision is over 20% better. The recall
for KNN is at 61% which is slightly less than Feature 1, but the precision is 20%
better. The precision-recall curve for KNN and SVM is shown in Figure 3·3. These
results demonstrate that using machine learning models is better than using a single
plausibility check metric.
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Figure 3·3: Precision-Recall Curve of KNN and SVM for Attack De-
tection
3.5.3 Attack Classification
To analyze the similarity between the attacks, KNN was used to do a multiclass clas-
sification between all five types of attacks. This experiment observed which attacks
have similar BSM behavior. For this experiment all of the normal behaving vehicle
data was removed from the training and test set, only the data from the 5 different
attack types were kept. Once a misbehavior has been detected, it is also important
to classify the misbehavior in order to take action steps.
From the confusion matrix in Table 3.3, we can observe that type 1 and type 16
are the most confused attack types. For all the true type 16 attackers, 44% were
classified as type 1 attacks. This is likely because type 16 attackers become type 1
attackers. Type 16 attacker start off behaving normally before sending a constant
location simulating a sudden stop. The sending of the constant location becomes
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Table 3.3: Confusion Matrix of Attack Type Classification
Ground Truth
Type 1 Type 2 Type 4 Type 8 Type 16
Predicted
Type 1 0.7505 0.0523 0.0015 0.0544 0.4408
Type 2 0.0189 0.7714 0 0.0223 0.2032
Type 4 0.1201 0.1187 0.9917 0.1441 0.1173
Type 8 0.0162 0.0093 0.0068 0.7722 0.0189
Type 16 0.0942 0.0484 0 0.0071 0.2198
a constant location type 1 attack. Type 4 attacks seem to differentiate from other
attack types, with a 99% correct classification rate. The other attacks with the
exception of type 16 have around 75% correct classification rates. All of the attack
types seems to resemble type 4 attacks; each attack was misclassified as attack 4 by
over 10%. Type 4 is the random location attack. Hence, features such as Feature
6, difference in displacement and predicted displacement, will be extreme for type 4.
The misclassified attack may have been the extreme cases of the attack types where
the differences in the features would resemble a random location attack.
3.6 Discussion
The VeReMi dataset provides significant misbehaving vehicles, hence, simple machine
learning techniques worked as proof-of-concept. However if the misbehaving vehicle
count was extremely low and there were anomalous or outliers in the dataset in
comparison to the normal behaving vehicles, anomaly detection techniques such as
One-Class SVM would be necessary to account for the extremely unbalanced dataset.
In our tests, KNN performed relatively well in comparison to the plausibility check
features. The most optimal value for K in KNN was 1 in majority of the tests, and this
does not come as a surprise. Indeed, in the KDD cup competition, where the context
of the dataset was intrusion detection, 1-NN performed well (University of California
Irvine, 1999). In certain tests KNN performs better than SVM. An example in which
SVM could have a lower performance than KNN is if the training set for both SVM
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and KNN contained attacks that had extreme levels of misbehavior and only a few
attacks that were common misbehaviors. SVMs would ignore those common attacks
and create marginal hyperplane separating only the extreme misbehaving vehicles
and the non-misbehaving vehicles. SVM would use the common attacks as support
vectors allowing slack in order to maximize the separation between the marginal
hyperplanes. In doing so, this would misclassify any normal misbehaving vehicle.
However, KNN would simply compute the nearest neighbor, which would still be an
attack if the closest neighbor was an attack. This could explain the performance
difference between KNN and SVM throughout the experiments.
Separating the misbehavior detection and attack type classification into two steps
perform better than directly classifying the vehicle as normal or attack type x. Try-
ing to directly classify the vehicle without removing the normal data will yield a
unbalanced dataset, making the classification less accurate. Separating detection and
classification into two steps is better as the detection can be done without balanced
data.
We observe that the detection rate of our machine learning models heavily de-
pends on the performance of the plausibility check feature; based on this observation
we can assume with better and more advanced plausibility checks added to our fea-
ture vector the performance in detection rate would increase. Our plausibility check
features did not use data from other vehicles to determine if the sender was legitimate,
hence relaxing the assumption that majority of the vehicles were honest. However,
with collaborative system that uses other vehicles’ information for plausibility checks,
additional plausibility checks could be added to our feature vector, hence increasing
its performance. The downside of this cooperative network lies on the the assumption
that the majority of neighboring vehicles are honest.
While the plausibility checks are an important part of detecting misbehavior,
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the quantitative data included alongside the plausibility checks may be the cause
for higher precision. Plausibility checks remove raw data which contains informa-
tion about the vehicles movement, by only producing deterministic decisions about
the data. Therefore, keeping the quantitative data provides more resolution for the
machine learning models to make more informed decisions.
This chapter does not aim at comparing SVM and KNN, however, based on the
precision-recall curves, we can see that SVM and KNN work better on certain types
of attacks. They are comparable in most cases but we can observe that for attack
types 1, 2, and 16 SVM performs better, while KNN does better with attack types 4
and 8. In the overall detection KNN and SVM perform similarly and are within 4%
apart in CCR, precision and recall.
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Chapter 4
Novel Physical Layer Misbehavior
Detection using RSSI
4.1 Introduction
A possible approach for implementing misbehavior detection is to run plausibility
checks at the application layer (namely, by checking the plausibility of the contents
of the BSMs). Chapter 3 proposes machine learning algorithms to this effect, and
the performance of the algorithms are verified against the VeReMi dataset (van der
Heijden et al., 2018). This dataset, simulated and built on top of the VEINS simu-
lator (Sommer et al., 2011), contains labeled data consisting of well-behaved vehicles
along with five different type of position forging attacks. The work of the previous
chapter shows that, overall, a K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) algorithm yields a de-
tection rate of 61% while a Support Vector Machines (SVM) algorithm achieves a
detection rate 65%. However, it turns out that these algorithms fail in effectively
detecting certain position forging attacks that mimic the movements of a real vehicle.
The work of (Chen et al., 2018) exploits this weakness to mount a practical attack
against a real Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG) for connected vehicles.
These limitations of application layers plausibility checks call for the design of
additional, complementary approaches. In this chapter, we propose, design, and eval-
uate new plausibility checks that operate at the physical layer. While there already
exist misbehavior detection algorithms based on physical layer properties such as
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Angle-of-Arrival (AoA), Direction-of-Arrival (DoA), Doppler-Shift, Time-Difference-
of-Arrival (TDoA), and Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) (Yu et al., 2013;
Das and Saha, 2015; Yan et al., 2008), most of these approaches attempt to defend
against a specific type of attacks (e.g., a Sybil attack). In contrast, our aim is to
design algorithms whose robustness are tested against a range of possible attacks,
including the attack used in (Chen et al., 2018).
Our approach is based on collecting the RSSI value obtained from each individual
BSM and on using this data to determine whether a received BSM is malicious. We
propose three plausibility checks to classify the transmitting vehicle as either malicious
or normal. These plausibility checks are evaluated against the VeReMi dataset.
The contributions of this chapter are five-fold:
1. We augment the VeReMi dataset with new information (i.e., the location of
the receiving vehicles for each BSM), which is necessary for performing physical
layer analysis.
2. We qualitatively validate the RSSI data produced by VeReMi by performing a
comparison with actual RSSI data obtained under real-world conditions.
3. We statistically characterize the RSSI behavior of five different position-forging
attacks.
4. We introduce a physical layer misbehavior detection system in the form of three
plausibility checks First-BSM (FBSM), Majority-BSM (MBSM), and Weighted-
BSM (WBSM) that are used to detect misbehavior.
5. We perform an in-depth evaluation of the performance of these three plausibility
checks and compare their performance with the application layer plausibility
checks of Chapter 3. We show that, overall, FBSM and WBSM achieve much
higher detection rates (recall) and precision.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the experimental setup.
Section 4.3 introduces our RSSI-based plausibility checks. Section 4.4 explains our
experiments before Section 4.5 presents our results. Section 4.6 discusses current
limitations of our system.
4.2 Experimental Setup
The first step is to recreate simulations in VeReMi. We change the code in VeReMi
needs to properly record the receiver’s location at the time of a received BSMs arrival.
Next, we create a script that parses the data and converts the file format from JSON
to CSV. The JSON file output of VeReMi’s current framework indeed has many
objects inside one file formatted in an unorthodox manner. Columns in the CSV file
contain information about the vehicle including the label of the vehicle in the last
column. We plan to release this script and the newly generated dataset to facilitate
future work on physical layer analysis.
4.2.1 RSSI Behavior
Real vs. Simulation
We first qualitatively validate the RSSI data produced by the simulator. Specifically,
we run simulations for high traffic density vehicles and a 30% attacker density. Fig-
ure 4·1 shows the raw simulation BSM data produced using VeReMi. The yellow
points represent each individual BSM sent, and the trend line represents the mean
value at each distance apart away from the receiving and transmitting vehicle.
We generate Figure 4·2 from the iTETRIS dataset previously mentioned. We
consider 4 different scenarios: (1) direct line-of-sight (LOS) (traces T1 and T2);
(2) non-line-of-sight (NLOS) (traces T3 and T4); (3) bridges and elevation (trace
T7); and (4) trees and vegetation (traces T8 and T9). Note that we focus on the
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Figure 4·1: Simulated RSSI behavior according to distance between
receiver and transmitter.
qualitative behavior of the data, rather than the precise numerical values. As stated
above, RSSI values depend on the environment, hence it is important to find out
whether the behavior appears consistent for all environments.
From the figures, we observe that (1) the RSSI behavior for real-data does stay
consistent across different environments; (ii) the RSSI behavior for the simulation
data closely resembles the real-world data. These observations justify the use of
VeReMi to test the performance of plausibility checks.
4.2.2 Misbehavior vs. Normal Behavior
To create a misbehavior detection system using RSSI, it is important to understand
the RSSI behavior caused by different attacks. In this case, by observing attacks of
type 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 described in the VeReMi dataset, we next show that these
attacks exhibit distinct RSSI vs. distance behavior. Note that for normal behavior, the
distance represents the real distance, while for misbehavior, the distance is erroneous
due to the spoofed positions advertised by attackers.
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Figure 4·2: Real RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver
and transmitter. Note that traces T1 and T2 correspond to line-of-sight,
while traces T3 and T4 correspond to non-line-of-sight (NLOS).
Attack Type 1: Constant Position
The first case is when attackers advertise a constant position, while they are actu-
ally moving. Figure 4·3 shows spikes. These spikes are primarily due to stationary
receiver vehicles receiving constant position BSMs from attackers. Hence, these sta-
tionary receivers receive many messages corresponding to the same (fake) distance.
Since the attackers are moving and the real distance is changing, the range of RSSI
corresponding to the (fake) fixed distance varies significantly behind normal. An-
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Figure 4·3: RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver and
transmitter for Attack Type 1
other important observation is that the real communication range for normal vehicles
is at most 800m, but many fake distances induced by the BSMs of constant position
attackers far exceed that communication range.
Attack Type 2: Constant Offset
The RSSI vs. distance curve is shown in Figure 4·4. We note that this curve is
symmetrical. The right half of the attacker RSSI vs. distance curve seems to have
shifted in distance in comparison to the normal curve, and this is because the constant
offset makes a misbehaving vehicle appear farther away than its true location. The left
half of the attacker RSSI vs. distance curve corresponds to cases when the constant
offset makes a misbehaving vehicle appear closer to the receiving vehicle.
Attack Type 4: Random Position
Attack type 4’s behavior is shown in Figure 4·5. Since attack type 4 is a random
position attack, we can see that the RSSI vs. distance curve is random, similar to a
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Figure 4·4: RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver and
transmitter for Attack Type 2
uniform distribution.
Attack Type 8: Random Offset
This attack has the behavior most similar to normal. Attack type 8 is a random
offset attack, which means that sometimes the offset can be very small. Therefore,
some of the RSSI data will behave normally. Nevertheless. similar to the constant
offset (attack type 2), there is still a pattern which resembles a shifted normal RSSI
vs. distance curve.
Attack Type 16: Eventual Stop
The behavior of attack type 16 is shown in Figure 4·7. Not surprisingly, this sudden
stop attack closely resembles the constant position attack (Attack type 1) since the
sudden stop attack turns into a constant position attack.
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Figure 4·5: RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver and
transmitter for Attack Type 4
4.3 Plausibility Checks
4.3.1 Identifying Anomalous BSMs
The framework for the vehicular misbehavior detection system is shown in Figure 4·8.
When a vehicle enters a new area it must know the RSSI versus distance distribution,
either by downloading it from a trustworthy source such as a roadside-unit (RSU)
(see Section 4.6 for further discussion) or predefined. This distribution will be used
to classify individual BSMs.
At every reception, the RSSI is computed by the receiver. Using the RSSI distri-
bution and the RSSI computed by the vehicle, the BSM will be classified as normal
or as anomalous. The class of the BSM will be used as an input to the three different
plausibility checks described in this Section. The output of these plausibility checks
classify the sender as normal or misbehaving.
In order to check if a vehicle is misbehaving, the RSSI and location of each BSM
must be cross-validated. Our approach, shown in Figure 4·9, is to generate confidence
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Figure 4·6: RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver and
transmitter for Attack Type 8
intervals for normal RSSI values based on the BSM dataset for normal behavior. For
each BSM, we record the GPS coordinates from the transmitting vehicle and the
receiving vehicle to measure the difference in distance between the two vehicles. Then,
we group together BSMs with similar distance between transmitting and receiving
vehicles, and we compute the confidence interval for each group based on the mean
and the variance. The resolution of the grouping is 1 meter, meaning that each group
contains BSMs whose distance between the transmitting and receiving vehicles differ
by at most 1 meter. Using the confidence intervals as thresholds, every individual
BSM is checked for potential malicious activity. If the RSSI of the BSM at a given
distance from the receiver is outside of the confidence interval, then we mark the BSM
as anomalous. The thresholds are illustrated in Figure 4·9.
4.3.2 Misbehavior Detection Algorithms
We propose three vehicular plausibility checks based on the BSM check. The first
plausibility check is the “safety first” approach. In this plausibility check, once a BSM
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Figure 4·7: RSSI behavior according to distance between receiver and
transmitter for Attack Type 16
is outside of the confidence interval, then the transmitting vehicle is immediately
classified as a misbehaving vehicle. This plausibility check will be referred to as the
First-BSM or the FBSM approach.
The second plausibility check uses a majority rule. If the majority of the BSMs
are classified as malicious, then the vehicle is classified as malicious. This plausibility
check will be referred to as the Majority-BSM approach or the MBSM approach.
There should be a difference in performance between FBSM and MBSM. FBSM
should yield more false positives as it is more sensitive, whereas MBSM should have
a higher miss-rate.
The third plausibility check is referred to as the Weighted-BSM or WBSM plau-
sibility check. This plausibility check assigns a score to each vehicle, and updates this
score for every new BSM the vehicle receives from the transmitting vehicle according
to a weighted moving average. If the vehicle reaches a score that is below a threshold,
which is outside the 99.7% of normal vehicle scores, then the vehicle is classified as
an attacker. The formula for calculating the plausibility score using the WBSM test
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Figure 4·8: Block diagram of detection misbehavior detection frame-
work
is as follows:
Plausibility Score = [(1− α) ∗ Scoreprev] + (α ∗ BSMscore),
where:
• α ∈ [0; 1]: The weight given to new information;
• Scoreprev : The most recent plausibility score of the vehicle;
• BSMscore : Boolean, 0 if the BSM is classified as malicious, 1 if normal.
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Figure 4·9: Thresholds on RSSI value per meter
4.4 Experiments
We conduct experiments using Matlab. We evaluate the performance of the plausi-
bility checks in terms of correct-classification rate (CCR), precision and recall, and
compare the performance to the application layer plausibility checks of (So et al.,
2018). The correct-classification rate is defined as the fraction of the correct classi-
fications to the total number of classifications. The precision is defined as TP
TP+FP
; a
true positive (TP ) is an attacker that is detected as an attacker, and a false positive
(FP ) is a normal vehicle detected as an attacker. The recall is TP
TP+FN
, where a false
negative (FN) corresponds to an attacker not being detected as an attacker.
Our first experiment aims to identify which confidence interval, 95% or 99.7%,
yields the best thresholds for determining malicious BSMs. Note that 99.7% or 3
standard deviations is commonly used a confidence interval to identify outliers or
anomalies (Dixon, 1953), hence those are the thresholds chosen to be tested. To do
this, the data from each individual position forging attack, constant position, constant
offset, random position, random offset, and eventual stop, are grouped and tested.
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Then, the overall test is conducted in which all of the different attack types are
merged together. For each test, the confidence interval used for the BSM plausibility
check is obtained to ensure optimal results as the mean and variance of each dataset
may slightly vary. We compared the precision, recall, and correct-classification rate
(CCR) to determine the best confidence interval to use for the plausibility checks.
Once the experiment for choosing the most suitable threshold is completed, we test
the FBSM and MBSM plausibility checks. For each type of attack, the FBSM and
MBSM plausibility checks are implemented and evaluated. Next, we perform tests
for the WBSM plausibility check. With this plausibility check, different values of α
must be considered. Hence, we consider values for α varying from 0.05 to 0.95, with
step size of 0.05. We ultimately select the value of α that generates the maximum
CCR, along with the corresponding precision and recall.
Note that initially, for each attack type, we use a different dataset to evaluate
the performance of the plausibility checks. For each different attack type, we collect
over 4 ∗ 105 BSMs over a span of 360 seconds in the VEINs simulation. Then, in
Section 4.5.7, we merge these datasets into a single dataset and test the performance
of the plausibility checks over the 5 different types of attacks.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Confidence Intervals
Table 4.1 shows results for 95% and 99.7% confidence intervals and the best results for
are highlighted. From Table 4.1, we note that the precision for the 99.7% confidence
interval is much higher than the precision for the 95% confidence interval. Yet,
the difference between the recall between the two confidence interval is marginal.
Therefore, for the plausibility checks, a 99.7% confidence threshold appears more
suitable.
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Table 4.1: BSM detection results for different attack type and confi-
dence intervals. The best performing method is highlighted in bold.
Detection Method CCR Precision Recall
Constant Position
95% 0.9331 0.9043 0.8857
99.7% 0.9583 0.9935 0.8761
Constant Offset
95% 0.8144 0.8465 0.5166
99.7% 0.8279 0.9880 0.4709
Random Position
95% 0.9710 0.9254 0.9987
99.7% 0.9999 0.9954 0.9987
Random Offset
95% 0.8293 0.7764 0.4605
99.7& 0.8489 0.9826 0.4122
Eventual Stop
95% 0.8397 0.8357 0.5587
99.7% 0.8616 0.9886 0.5304
4.5.2 Attack Type 1: Constant Position
The results for the constant position attacks are shown in Table 4.2, and the best
results are highlighted. The table shows that CCR and recall for FBSM, MBSM, and
WBSM are higher than for the SVM and KNN application layer plausibility checks
of (So et al., 2018). While the precision of SVM is perfect and the precision for KNN
is higher than FBSM, it is important to note that (So et al., 2018) uses a plausibility
check specifically targeting a constant position attack. This same reasoning strength-
ens the need for the proposed physical layer plausibility checks. Indeed, the recall
for the three physical layer checks ends up being higher because a receiving vehicle
sometimes receives only one BSM from a transmitter. The application layer has no
way of determining if the first BSM carries any inconsistent information. On the
other hand, the physical layer checks can readily check if the RSSI is plausible based
on the location advertised in that BSM.
We also observe that the detection rates for the FBSM approach are better than
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the detection rates for MBSM. However, in terms of precision and CCR, the results
for the MBSM approach are better. Indeed, for attack type 1, it may be possible that
an attacker vehicle is within a plausible distance away from the receiver vehicle the
majority of the time, hence causing a lower detection rate compared to the FBSM
method. The precision of the FBSM method is lower because of its high sensitivity.
Indeed, it only takes 1 bad BSM, which can be due to unusually high interference, to
classify the entire vehicle as an attacker.
The WBSM method performs better than the FBSM, but worse than the MBSM
in terms of precision, and better than MBSM and worse than FBSM in terms of
recall. However, the recall of the WBSM method is within 1% to the recall of the
FBSM method, but outperforms the FBSM method by over 2% in terms of precision.
In this case, the WBSM method seems to strike the best balance between recall and
precision.
4.5.3 Attack Type 2: Constant Offset
Table 4.2 shows the drastic performance performance improvement of physical layer
plausibility checks over machine learning based application layer plausibility checks
for constant offset attacks. MBSM beats both KNN and SVM by over 20% and FBSM
and WBSM beats KNN and SVM by over 50% in terms of recall. The reason for this
significant difference is that the constant offset attack on the application layer behaves
like a normal vehicle. The position, velocity, and acceleration all behave normally,
hence it is virtually undetectable.
Table 4.2 also shows a significant difference in recall between FBSM and MBSM.
The recall of the FBSM method beats the MBSM method by over 30%. MBSM’s
advantage in precision is 8%, which is marginal compared to the recall advantage of
the FBSM plausibility check. The overall CCR of the FBSM method is about 8%
higher than the MBSM method, which concludes that the FBSM method is better
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than the MBSM method detecting attack type 2. The WBSM method performs
similar to the FBSM method, however once again it has slightly lower recall, but
around 3% higher precision than the FBSM method. Hence, the WBSM method
again can be viewed as the best performing method.
4.5.4 Attack Type 4: Random Position
The results for attack type 4 show that all of the plausibility checks perform perfectly
in terms of recall as seen in Table 4.2. This shows that once again the three physical
layer plausibility checks outperform the application layer machine learning. The main
difference is that the physical layer checks only need 1 BSM to make a conclusion
whether or not the vehicle is malicious or not. In the application layer the receiving
vehicle needs at least 2 BSMs to make a conclusion.
The main difference between FBSM, MBSM, and WBSM is the performance in
precision between the checks. The MBSM method would be the best choice for
detecting attack type 4 since it has the highest precision value.
4.5.5 Attack Type 8: Random Offset
Interestingly, random offset is the only attack in this dataset, where the physical
layer methods do not outperform SVM and KNN. This is most likely due to the fact
that the random offset is seen as noise, from the perspective of the physical layer.
However, SVM and KNN are only marginally better than FBSM and WBSM.
Similar to the results for type 2, there is a significant advantage for using FBSM
over MBSM in terms of recall. As seen in Table 4.2, FBSM’s recall is over 50% better
than MBSM’s recall, making the 8% difference in precision negligible. The reason for
this significant difference in performance is that, since the offset is randomly placed,
the majority of the malicious BSMs might have been inside the threshold, hence
causing the MBSM plausibility check to incorrectly classify the vehicle as a whole.
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The performance of the WBSM method is much closer to the FBSM method, and
similarly to all the results, WBSM has a higher precision with only a slightly lower
recall.
4.5.6 Attack Type 16: Eventual Stop
For this attack type, FBSM and WBSM outperforms SVM and KNN by 25% in
detection rate, and over 10% in precision. The results of MBSM’s detection rate is
similar to SVM and KNN, however the precision is over 17% better.
We also note a huge performance gap between FBSM and MBSM. FBSM performs
26% better than MBSM in terms of recall. In terms of precision MBSM performs
better by 8%. The drastic change in recall is due that sometimes the labeled attacker
vehicle does not misbehave until the end of the communication transaction. This
means that during more than 50% of the transaction the attacking vehicle is com-
municating with the receiver normally; hence the MBSM check fails. The WBSM
plausibility check shows an improvement in precision and a slight decrease in recall,
showing that WBSM is the best method here.
4.5.7 Overall Detection
The overall detection results from the combined dataset using all 5 attacks for the
three physical layer plausibility checks and two application layer plausibility checks
are shown in Table 4.3. With the exception of MBSM, FBSM and WBSM perform
close to 20% better in terms of detection rate than SVM and KNN; in addition to
the significant improvement in detection rate, the precision for all three physical layer
plausibility checks are much better than SVM and KNN. This shows overall that even
without machine learning, using the physical layer for misbehavior detection, specifi-
cally position spoofing attacks, is more effective than application layer (although the
two could certainly be used in conjunction).
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As observed, the MBSM approach yields the highest precision or the lowest false-
positive rate. However, in terms of overall performance, FBSM and WBSM perform
much better. Both the FBSM and WBSM approaches outperform the MBSM ap-
proach by 20% in terms of detection rate, and have over a 5% higher overall clas-
sification rate. This shows that the FBSM and WBSM tests are better approaches
to create a misbehavior detection system. The WBSM test can be seen as a more
robust test, since the detection rate consistently drops by less than 1% compared to
the extremely sensitive FBSM method. However the precision is higher by 3%.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Real-time Detection: Access to Local RSSI Distribution
In a real-time detection system, concerns may arise on how vehicles will be able to get
the data in order to create the thresholds. One solution could reside in using road-side
units (RSU). Since RSSI confidence intervals are highly sensitive to the environment,
the RSUs can be used to store data, and create the thresholds for its surrounding
environment. The RSUs can then relay the information to the vehicles entering
the communication range of the RSU, using WAVE Service Advertisement (WSA)
messages for example. However, the robustness and reliability of these plausibility
checks rely on the trustworthiness and accuracy of the source that provides the RSSI
distribution (the RSU in the case described earlier). If that source is compromised,
then the vehicle will not be able to rely on this detection method alone. A fail-safe
can be implemented where the vehicle can survey and build the RSSI distribution on
its own or in collaboration with neighboring vehicles.
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4.6.2 Stronger Attacker Model
A more advanced attacker model could include an attacker that adjusts the trans-
mission power in order to fool receiver(s). However, with our detection system, this
attack can only fool one vehicle. Since the other vehicles will be in a different rel-
ative location from the attack, those vehicles will still be able to detect an attack
and report the vehicle. To fool multiple spaced receivers, a even stronger attacker
is required, e.g. one that could perform multi-antenna beamforming. Beam forming
allows an attacker to only communicate with one vehicle without being detected by
the others (Liu et al., 2013; Van Veen and Buckley, 1988).
4.6.3 Assumption on Majority of Honest Neighbors
The plausibility checks proposed do not rely on other vehicles’ data in order to detect
misbehaviors, since the vehicle will determine the RSSI locally within its system. The
only prior information vehicles need is the distribution of RSSI vs. distance, which
can be provided by a trustworthy source such as an RSU. In doing so, this relaxes
the constraint that majority of the vehicles in an area must be honest to detect
misbehavior.
4.6.4 Precision vs. Recall
The precision vs recall trade-off is frequently mentioned in this chapter. From a safety
point of view we always want to be able to have the highest recall, which would mean
that FBSM would be the best approach. However, due to the very marginal loss in
recall, versus the larger increase in precision of the WBSM, we believe that WBSM is
the best among the three methods. In practice, the claim of which plausibility check
is the best should be based upon the priorities of the operator. However, we note
that these plausibility checks could be used together as well. FBSM can be used as
the initial detection method, and MBSM and WBSM can later be used to further
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Figure 4·10: Precision-Recall curves of WBSM for each attack type.
These curves are obtained by varying α from 0.05 to 0.95, with step
increments of 0.05.
investigate the vehicle to confirm the claim that the vehicle is misbehaving.
4.6.5 Detection Latency
One important factor to take into consideration is the latency of detection. The
FBSM approach may have the highest false positive rate, but it also has the lowest
latency in term of detection. The MBSM approach has the highest precision but
also the highest latency. This is true for an attack such as the sudden stop attack.
Since the vehicle builds trust inside the system by behaving normally, it will need
to misbehave for a longer period of time in order to be classified as a misbehavior,
explaining why WBSM is the more balanced solution. This method assigns more
weights to recent BSMs, thus, decreasing the latency of MBSM, but yet keeping a
higher precision than FBSM. Results for different settings of the weighting parameter
α are shown in Figure 4·10. The choice of α can heavily influence latency; if α close
to 0 then it will simply behave like MBSM, and if the value of α is close to 1 it will
60
behave similar to FBSM. Hence, α must be tuned in such a way that it is reasonable
for the operator to precisely, accurately, and quickly detect misbehaving vehicles in
the system. However, the problem of balancing trust versus latency, and precision
versus recall will always be a trade-off in the proposed methods.
4.6.6 Complementing Application Layer Misbehavior Detection
One should note that attack type 2, i.e. the constant offset attack, is a very difficult
attack to detect on the application layer. This is because the ghost vehicle generated
by the attacker is a shadow of a real vehicle. All of the contents inside the BSM cross-
validate each other, leading to no inconsistencies between any of the fields. Using
physical layer properties such as RSSI, we showed that this attack can be detected.
However, we believe that these plausibility checks should be used as a subset of a
larger misbehavior detection system. These should be combined with application
layer plausibility checks in order to increase the overall detection perform.
4.6.7 RSSI vs. Other Physical Layer Properties
It is important to compare and contrast these physical layer properties and how they
can be applied and how plausible they are to misbehavior detection. Let us first
discuss the pros and the cons of each physical layer property to see why we have
chosen RSSI.
Table 4.4 shows that RSSI provides many positive and plausible characteristics.
Perhaps the most important advantage when dealing with the problem of a realistic
implementation of a misbehavior detection system is the fact that minimal hardware
is needed to collect the RSSI data. Another thing to consider is that while the Doppler
shift or speed also requires minimal hardware, it is only practical when vehicles are
moving at a significant speed.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose three different plausibility checks to build a physical layer
misbehavior detection framework. Using VeReMi, we evaluate plausibility checks for
five different types of attacks, before evaluating their overall performance in aggregate.
We find that overall WBSM achieves the best performance, yielding a 83.73% recall
with a 95.91% precision rate. Comparing the results to application layer plausibility
checks (So et al., 2018), we find that WBSM and FBSM perform much better in every
performance metric, by around 5% in CCR, 5% in precision, and 20% in recall.
This chapter makes other important contributions, including (i) generating an
enhanced VeReMi dataset (which we plan to share with the research community)
that should facilitate the evaluation of physical layer misbehavior algorithms, and
(ii) validating the RSSI data produced by VeReMi with actual RSSI data traces.
Our work also characterizes the RSSI signature of the five forging position attacks
simulated in VeReMi.
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Table 4.2: Detection results of physical layer vs. machine learning-
based application layer plausibility checks of Chapter 3. The best per-
forming method is highlighted in bold font.
Detection Method CCR Precision Recall
Constant Position
KNN 0.9452 0.9521 0.8328
SVM 0.9564 1.000 0.8290
FBSM 0.9572 0.9344 0.9300
MBSM 0.9641 0.9997 0.8868
WBSM 0.9634 0.9545 0.9286
Constant Offset
KNN 0.7508 0.5613 0.1937
SVM 0.7543 0.5729 0.1788
FBSM 0.8943 0.9180 0.7311
MBSM 0.8150 0.9993 0.4154
WBSM 0.8988 0.9424 0.7244
Random Position
KNN 0.9463 0.9506 0.8363
SVM 0.9116 0.8149 0.8860
FBSM 0.9832 0.9537 1.000
MBSM 0.9999 0.9997 1.000
WBSM 0.9886 0.9681 1.000
Random Offset
KNN 0.9471 0.9627 0.8253
SVM 0.9177 0.8035 0.8755
FBSM 0.9307 0.9126 0.8068
MBSM 0.8143 0.9986 0.2762
WBSM 0.9368 0.9402 0.8049
Eventual Stop
KNN 0.8173 0.7143 0.4254
SVM 0.8403 0.8162 0.4636
FBSM 0.8949 0.9129 0.7120
MBSM 0.8366 0.9998 0.4471
WBSM 0.9005 0.9404 0.7081
Table 4.3: Overall detection results. Best performing method is high-
lighted in bold font.
Detection Method CCR Precision Recall
KNN 0.8788 0.8879 0.6166
SVM 0.8838 0.8716 0.6515
FBSM 0.9312 0.9294 0.8421
MBSM 0.8860 0.9996 0.6280
WBSM 0.9376 0.9591 0.8373
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Physical Layer Pros ConsProperty
RSSI
-Equipment for measurement is
lightweight and accessible
-Check location distinction
-Determine location proximity
-Multiple nodes can triangulate
location (Cooperative Network)
-Has high variability or variance
in value due to changing SNR,
NLOS conditions, etc.
-Attacker could simply alter
transmitting power
-Single nodes cannot determine
exact location of transmitter
(transmitters behind or in front
of the car at the same
proximity will have the same
RSSI)
Doppler Shift
-Can be used to triangulate signal
to determine location(Cooperative
Network)
-Can use SDRs and Radars for
measurement
-Good for detecting relative speed,
acceleration
-Cannot detect distance or even
relative distance
-Cannot determine location with
single measurement
-Measurement accuracy depends
on noise and environment
-Can be spoofed by changing
carrier frequency of transmitter
-Gives no information if both the
transmitter and receiver are
moving at the same velocity
AoA/DoA
-Good for detecting relative
location of transmitter in terms
of direction
-The angle and direction of
transmission can be found
2-dimensionally
-Needs heavy equipment
(Phase arrays, uniform
circular array), or multiple
locations to get accurate results
-Cannot determine proximity of
the vehicles
-Susceptible to multipath attacks
where the transmitter can send
message from another remote
source changing the angle
or direction
TDoA
-Good for detecting location
distinction, and proximity
-Computing requires minimal
hardware
-Synchronicity is a must
-Latency depends on the
transmission channel as well
as the distance creating variability
-Cannot determine location, other
than proximity
Table 4.4: Pros and Cons of Physical Layer Properties
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Misbehavior Detection
In this work we addressed the issue of detecting and classifying location spoofing
attacks. We proposed applying machine learning techniques and compared them
to basic plausibility checks. To enable reproduction of our work, we implemented
KNN and SVM, and evaluated them on the VeReMi dataset. We also contributed by
publishing an “ML-friendly” VeReMi dataset (OnBoard Security, 2018).
Results showed that our proof-of-concept of a misbehavior detection system that
combines plausibility checks and machine learning provides 20% higher precision while
maintaining a recall within 5% percent of the recall of plausibility checks. Our frame-
work not only detects misbehaviors, but classifies the misbehaviors thus enabling
more specific actions to combat the misbehavior.
We also proposed three different plausibility checks to build a physical layer mis-
behavior detection framework. Using VeReMi, we evaluated plausibility checks for
five different types of attacks, before evaluating their overall performance in aggre-
gate. We found that overall WBSM achieves the best performance, yielding a 83.73%
recall with a 95.91% precision rate. Comparing the results to the application layer
plausibility checks of Chapter 3, we find that WBSM and FBSM perform much bet-
ter in every performance metric, by around 5% in CCR, 5% in precision, and 20% in
recall.
Chapter 4 made other important contributions, including (i) generating an en-
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hanced VeReMi dataset (which we plan to share with the research community) that
should facilitate the evaluation of physical layer misbehavior algorithms, and (ii) val-
idating the RSSI data produced by VeReMi with actual RSSI data traces. Our work
also characterized the RSSI signature of the five position forging attacks simulated in
VeReMi. We conclude by observing that physical layer detection is an effective way
of detecting position spoofing attacks, including powerful traffic congestion attacks.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Application Layer and Machine Learning
On the application layer, one could explore other plausibility checks such as GPS and
map verification. If the location specified by vehicles could be cross-validated with
road maps, then the constant offset attack could be mitigated. Another area open for
future research is finding stronger plausibility checks as feature vectors in the machine
learning models. The strength of the plausibility checks has a direct impact on the
performance of the machine learning models, hence improving the plausibility checks
will further improve the performance of misbehavior detection.
Applying different and more advanced machine learning models is another area
for future work. In this work, we only used two well-known and relatively simple
machine learning techniques. More advanced artificial intelligence techniques, such
as neural networks, were not used in this thesis.
5.2.2 Physical Layer
More work could be performed on physical layer misbehavior detection. Using phys-
ical layer properties such as, Doppler shift, AoA/DoA, and TDoA, other plausibility
checks could be implemented. By observing the normal behavior of these physical
layer properties and characterizing the behavior of an attacker, it should be possible
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to create plausibility checks similar to the RSSI plausibility check proposed.
Other plausibility checks based on the RSSI investigated could also be proposed.
For instance, instead of only exploring the RSSI relationship with respect to distance,
it may be possible to explore the RSSI relationship with respect to velocity and
acceleration. Using those, it may be possible to identify inconsistencies between the
attacker’s physical layer behavior and the contents of BSMs.
5.2.3 Misbehavior Detection System
Combining the physical layer along with the application layer plausibility checks
as a feature vector into a machine learning model could significantly enhance the
misbehavior detection system. This system would be more comprehensive and likely
generate better performance. Recording quantitative measurements on the latency of
this system in real-time with varying computational power is another area open for
future work.
5.2.4 More Powerful Adversary
Now that we have considered position forging attacks where attackers are assumed
to have inconsistencies in the application layer, or do not change their transmis-
sion power, one should consider a stronger attacker. Once considering this stronger
attacker, one should check whether the performance of the proposed misbehavior de-
tection methods will stay similar or degrade. An example of a stronger attacker is
an attacker that uses machine learning or generative adverserial networks to create
a ghost vehicle that behaves normally on the application layer, and also dynamically
changes the power transmission depending on the location of the targeted victim
vehicle.
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